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Marital Property Law in England
and California: A Comparative
Study and Critique
by ANGELA M. BRADSTREET*
LL.B. Bristol University, 1976; LL.M., University of California,
Berkeley, 1980; Member, California Bar.
This essay is a comparative study of marital property systems1
of England and California. England's separation of property sys-
tem and California's community property system are examined
and compared in the context of marriage dissolution and death.
A system of separation of property is defined as one in which
each spouse may own property as if he were not married, the fact
of marriage being totally irrelevant in determining property rights.
The California community property system includes all prop-
erty which is acquired by either spouse upon and during the sub-
sistence of marriage when not acquired as the separate property of
either.2 The system should be distinguished from other types of
community systems. It is not a full community property system
such as exists in Belgium and South Africa. Nor is it a system of
"deferred community", which is presently in force in Sweden, Nor-
way, Denmark, Finland and Iceland.
* Research for this paper was assisted by funds from the Walter Johnson Perry Gradu-
ate Research Fellowship. The author wishes to express sincere thanks to her supervising
Professor, Herma Hill Kay, both for her help and advice regarding the paper and also for
her interest in the general welfare of the author over the past months. The author is very
grateful to Michael Loup for his support and counsel regarding her decision to pursue fur-
ther academic study in the United States and also for the general backing, both financial
and moral, from all the partners at Boodle Hatfield & Co. The author should particularly
like to thank John Smith, to whom she owes so much, for his loyal support and kind help.
Special thanks go to Sherry Cook for unwisely agreeing to type this paper. Finally, the
author is grateful to her family and friends in England who have remained close to her,
despite the great geographical distance between them.
1. Marital property should be distinguished from support. The former involves owner-
ship rights attaching to assets; the latter involves an allocation of cash belonging to one
spouse to the other based on need.
2. CAL. CIv. CODE. § 687 (West 1954).
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
There is a fundamental difference in the philosophy underly-
ing these two marital property systems. The English system of sep-
aration of property is based on the principle that in England "the
law for the great becomes the law for all".' In contrast, California's
community property system is fundamentally founded on the dem-
ocratic principles of the Unites States.
In England, the hierarchical class structure with the aristoc-
racy controlling the country's laws, wealth and politics, and the in-
troduction of the feudal system were two prime socio-economic in-
fluences upon the evolution of separate property.
In Medieval common law4 husband and wife became one:
"[T]he very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband." 5 As a result, all the wife's personal prop-
erty vested in her husband upon marriage so that he had power to
dispose of it inter vivos or by will. He was entitled to an interest in
all land belonging to the wife at the time of the marriage for as
long as the marriage subsisted. Where the land was freehold the
husband's interest was known as "coverture," whereby he was enti-
tled to take all the fruits and profits of the land. He could alienate
these rights, but not rights greater than he himself possessed. Thus
the land reverted to the wife upon the husband's death or upon
termination of the marriage."
Since, in the eyes of the law, the wife's being was merged into
the husband's, the wife could not enter into contracts (unless she
was acting as the husband's agent) and the husband was jointly
liable with the wife for any torts committed by the wife. The right
to her earnings and to any savings made out of them vested in the
husband and she could not make a will without the husband's con-
sent. In short, the wife was considered a possession, not a conjugal
partner.
Thus it was left to equity to pave the way for reform. Through
the machinery of the trust and marriage settlement, the upper
classes were allowed to make investments in the names of married
3. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 402 (2d ed. 1898).
4. For a detailed account of the position of husband and wife at common law see IV.
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMmENTARiES ch. 15 (Oxford 1765).
5. Id. at 442.
6. Where there were children the husband gained the right to hold the wife's land
during the whole of his life. Such a right was known as curtesy.
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women without permitting the husband to interfere either by vir-
tue of ownership or by disposition. As a rule, separate property
could be created only through an express and formal transaction,
such as a marriage settlement, which meant that only the daugh-
ters of wealthy families were "liberated".7 Property given to a trus-
tee (whether he was a third person or the husband himself) for the
married woman's "separate use," in equity, had to be administered
in accordance with her instructions, irrespective of the invalidity of
those instructions at common law. The husband had no right to
participate in the administration or in the enjoyment of such prop-
erty. With regard to her "separate estate," the wife was able to
acquire contractual rights and obligations. As trust beneficiary in
equity, she was capable of acquiring, owning and disposing of
property inter vivos or by will. Thus, with regard to separate prop-
erty, irrespective of its nature, equity gave to the married woman
the status of equality which the common law refused to grant her.
Hence until late in the 19th Century, there existed in effect
two 'regimes matrimoniaux': the common law for the many, equity
for the few. The advent of the industrial revolution brought pres-
sure for reform; the solution was the introduction of a system of
separation of property at common law whereby each spouse was
free to own and dispose of his or her property as if he or she were
single.
The Married Women's Property Act of 1882,8 which repealed
an earlier act of 1870,9 provided that any woman should be entitled
to retain all property owned by her at the time of the marriage as
her separate property and that she "[s]hall be capable of acquiring,
holding, and disposing by will or otherwise, of any real or personal
property as her separate property, in the same manner as if she
were a femme sole."10
The sweeping nature of these changes is twofold. First, it be-
came impossible for a married man to acquire any further interest
in his wife's property (jure mariti) by operation of law. Second,
the wife was vested with a legal interest in her property.
In 1935, the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors)
7. Kahn-Freund, Matrimonial Property Law in England, in MATRIMONAL PROPERTY
LAW 267, 275 (W. Friedmann ed. 1955).
8. Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75.
9. Married Women's Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93; The Act remains of histor-
ical importance since it gave the first statutory extension to the existing equitable concept
of the separate estate.
10. Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, § 1(1).
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Act 1 modified the 1882 act and established a complete separation
of property system. Specifically, it enacted the rule of separation of
liabilities to the effect that neither spouse is liable as a spouse for
the debts and obligations of the other; nor are spouses jointly lia-
ble for any such debt or obligation. 2 Additionally, the husband
was no longer liable for the wife's torts. 3
For the next thirty years the law remained virtually static. In-
roads into the doctrine of separation of property have, however,
recently been made in the form of piecemeal legislation. 4 The Law
Commission has spent much time examining the entire system and
has drawn certain conclusions.'5 Yet for the time being, the 1935
Act remains the law and is likely to continue indefinitely to form
the basis of the separation of property system in English marital
law.
The California community property system is modeled upon
the Spanish system of marital property recognizing the coexistence
of both community and separate property. 6
Following the United States' conquest of California, the state
constitutional convention of 1849 advocated the continuance of a
Spanish-modeled law of community property1 and legislation in
1850 was created to define the difference between the two systems
of separate and community property.'" Separate property was that
owned before marriage or acquired thereafter by gift or inheri-
tance. Community property was that acquired by the husband or
the wife during the marriage except by gift or inheritance.
The coexistence of the two systems, together with a law which
mandated application of the English common law insofar as it was
not inconsistent with the laws of California, led to much confusion.
Although the common law as a rule of decision was repugnant to
and inconsistent with the community property laws of the state,19
11. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30.
12. Id. § 4(2).
13. Id. § 3(a).
14. See text accompanying notes 55-65 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 60-81 infra.
16. For a detailed history of the system see Prager, The Persistence of Separate Prop-
erty Concepts in California's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
1 (1976-77) and W. DE FUNAK & M. VAUGHAN, PRINCPLES OF COMMUNrrY PAOPERTY 83-87
(2d ed. 1971).
17. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 14.
18. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, 1849-50 Cal. Stats. 254-55 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of CAL. Civ. Con.).
19. See Prager, supra note 16 and W. DE FuNtAK & M. VAUGHAN, supra note 16.
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the courts attempted to determine community property questions
by applying the common law.20 In practical effect the wife's owner-
ship in the community became purely nominal, as she had no
power over either community property or her separate property.21
The husband came to be regarded as the full and complete owner
of the community property for as long as the marriage subsisted.
The prevailing view of the courts was that the wife's interest in the
community property was a mere "expectancy" 22 which vested only
upon termination of the marriage.
In an attempt to set boundaries on the husband's powers, leg-
islation began to focus upon the wife's rights to her separate prop-
erty. Thus certain similarities appear between developments in
California and England in the late 19th century; in each jurisdic-
tion the emphasis was on establishing independent rights for mar-
ried women. In 1872 the Civil Code established full managerial
power in the wife over her separate property;23 and in 1889 a statu-
tory presumption was enacted under which property conveyed to a
married woman by written instrument was presumed to be her
separate property.24 Thus the wife became free to title her separate
earnings in her own name and classify them as her separate
property.
The community property-separate property distinction was
equally apparent upon death under the laws of intestate succes-
sion. If the wife predeceased the husband her estate had no rights
in the community; the surviving husband took all. On the other
hand, if the husband predeceased the wife she took one-half of the
community property.
Between 1891 and 1927 a gradual erosion of the husband's
managerial powers occurred as certain restrictions were imposed
on his powers to deal with the community property. 5 Some of
20. See Van Maren v. Johnson, 16 Cal. 322 (1860).
21. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, §§ 6 & 9, 1849-50 Cal. Stats. 254.
22. The word "expectancy" was first used by Field, C.J. in Van Maren v. Johnson, 15
Cal. 308, 311 (1860) and was subsequently followed in a line of cases, e.g., Spreckels v.
Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 162 (West 1954) (current version at CAL Civ. CODE § 5107 (West
1970)).
24. Act of March 19, 1889, ch. 219, 1889 Cal. Stats. 328 (current version at CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980)).
25. E.g., Act of March 31, 1891, ch. 220, 1891 Cal. Stats. 425 (current version at CAL.
CIv. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980)) contained, inter alia, the following provision: "pro-
vided, however, that (the husband) cannot make a gift of such community property, or con-
vey the same without a valuable consideration, unless the wife, in writing, consents thereto."
No. 1]
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these restrictions remain today, albeit in modified form. It was im-
plicitly recognized that the wife did have certain rights during the
continuance of the community. Such a view was clearly inconsis-
tent with the "mere expectancy" theory which was finally abol-
ished in the 1920's.28 In 1923 an Amendment2V7 granted married
women testamentary power over one-half of the community, a
privilege which husbands had enjoyed since the 1860's. The legisla-
ture subseqently declared that the spousal interest in community
property was "present, existing and equal" subject to the manage-
rial powers of the husband.2 8 The rule of law was therefore estab-
lished that community property rights vested in both spouses im-
mediately upon marriage.
The practical consequences of this innovative legislation, how-
ever, were not as great as may have been supposed. The husband
still retained the crucial power of management and control of the
community property,29 with the result that the wife's right to equal
ownership was in many cases a mere fiction until termination of
the marriage.
The wife's position at that time was analogous to the wife's
position in England prior to 1882; in both cases the wife had no
right to administer and deal with property acquired during the
marriage. While a wife in California did have vested ownership
rights in the community, such rights were purely nominal in view
of the fact that the husband had exclusive management and
control.
It was not until the 1950's that California law accorded mar-
ried women the right to manage and control their earnings,30 pro-
vided that these earnings had not been commingled with the rest
of the community property. Still, the wife remained in a disfavored
position because of the husband's managerial powers. Community
property and separation of property were forced to exist together
in a state of continuous tension. Finally, in 1973, after fundamen-
tal legislative changes "perhaps for the first time since California's
constitutional convention, the community property policies became
26. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
27. Act of April 16, 1923, ch. 18, 1923 Cal. Stats. 29 (current version at CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 201 (West 1956)).
28. Act of April 28, 1927, ch. 265, § 1, 1927 Cal. Stats. 484 (current version at CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1980)).
29. See note 25 for example of the restrictions imposed on the husband's management
power.




The most significant feature of the recent legislation is the in-
troduction of equal management and control of the community
property by both spouses. After January 1, 1975, either spouse may
manage personal property of the community.32 Although either
spouse is granted managerial powers over community real property
there are restrictions requiring the consent of both spouses to cer-
tain transactions.33
Although this sweeping change in the law represents a clear
departure from the common law concept of separation of property,
traces of separate property law still remain in the California com-
munity property system. One writer has commented that one leg-
acy of a separate property era is a more advanced set of restric-
tions on the exercise of powers over the community property than
would otherwise have developed."
II. DURING THE MARRIAGE
A. England
At the same time that the 1882 Act gave recognition to a mar-
ried woman's rights to ownership of property, it also provided a
method of summarily resolving property disputes between the
spouses.
35
Before the House of Lords purported to resolve the issue3 s
there was much controversy as to whether Section 17 of the Act
gave the courts power to vary property rights or whether the sec-
tion merely gave courts power to recognize and declare existing
property rights already established by strict rules of law.
A series of cases in the Court of Appeal, 7 established the view
31. Prager, supra note 16, at 67.
32. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(a) (West Supp. 1980). But see CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(b)
(West Supp. 1980) which provides that a spouse may not make a gift of community personal
property without the written consent of the other.
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1980) provides that both spouses must join in
executing any instrument by which community real property is leased for a longer period
than a year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered.
34. Prager, supra note 16, at 80.
35. The Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, § 17 provides that in
any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, either
party may apply by summons or otherwise to a judge who may make such order as he sees
fit.
36. See Pettit v. Pettit, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966 and Gissing v. Gissing, [1969] 2 Ch. 85.
37. See Hazell v. Hazell, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 301; Chapman v. Chapman, [1969] 1 W.L.R.
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that Section 17 did equip the courts with an unfettered discretion
to vary property rights where it appeared just and equitable to do
so. It is clear that quasi-community principles were applied in con-
sidering whether a variation was just; the vital consideration was
whether the property in question was acquired as a "joint ven-
ture '" of the spouses. The notion of a joint venture or a joint en-
terprise involved some clear payment at the assumption of
financial obligation by both parties. It resulted in the rule of equal
division of income and of ultimate capital.
The precise amounts contributed by each party were immate-
rial. For example, in the case of Rimmer v. Rimmer 9 a husband
and wife acquired a house for $920.00 which was conveyed in the
husband's sole name. The spouses had made unequal contributions
to the purchase price. Finding a joint venture between the spouses,
the court divided the sale proceeds of $4200.00 equally.
One writer 40 has referred to the idea of a joint venture as an
"implied community". The two concepts are analogous in that they
each encompass the notion that during a marriage the spouses in-
tend to share ownership of property which is acquired through
their mutual efforts, despite the fact that legal title may be in one
spouse's sole name.
The Court of Appeal's interpretation of Section 17 has now,
however, been generally superseded 1 by two House of Lords deci-
sions, Pettit v. Pettit2 and Gissing v. Gissing.4' These cases have
established the principle that Section 17 merely permits the court
to declare existing ownership rights in property, and that English
law does not recognize any notion! of community property. The
cases establish the proposition that courts have no power, discre-
tionary or otherwise, to confer or vary any property rights. It has
therefore been resolved that Section 17 is merely a procedural sec-
tion; there can no longer be any possibility of a spouse being given
1367; Appleton v. Appleton, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 25; Hine v. Hine, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1124; Rim-
mer v. Rimmer, [1953] 1 Q.B. 63.
38. Denning, L.J. in Rimmer v. Rimmer, [1953] 1 Q.B. at 69.
39. [1953] 1 Q.B. 63.
40. A. KIRALFY, The English Law, in CoMPARATIvE LAW OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 200
(A. Kiralfy ed. 1972).
41. There is, however, authority for the proposition that the concept of a joint venture
still exists in cases involving a wife's acquisition of ownership in a husband's business. See
Nixon v. Nixon, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1676.
42. [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966.
43. [1969] 2 Ch. 85.
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an equal interest in property because of his or her unequal contri-
bution. The Law Commission 44 correctly recognized that the ex-
pression "family assets", although a convenient phrase, "has no
meaning and its use affords no assistance in determining property
rights.
4 5
How then do the courts determine ownership rights in the
event of a dispute during the marriage? It has been held4" that a
beneficial interest in property must either 1) coincide with the le-
gal estate, 2) arise under a resulting trust from a contribution to
the purchase price,47 or 3) arise from the agreement or common
intention of the parties.
The first proposition speaks for itself. With regard to the sec-
ond proposition it is not clear from the case law whether indirect,
as well as direct, financial contributions are sufficient to impose a
resulting trust.48 The problem is illustrated in the case of the mat-
rimonial home. Direct cash contributions which go to the price as a
whole, to mortgage payments or even to legal charges are clearly
sufficient. Suppose, however, that both spouses are working and
they agree for convenience that the husband pay the installments
due on the mortgage and the wife pay the household bills. Gissing
v. Gissing49 suggests that, provided the wife can show her indirect
contribution was referable to the acquisition of the house in the
sense that it freed the husband's own money to make cash pay-
ments, her contributions will give rise to a resulting trust.50 By
comparison, the Court of Appeal has expressed the view that no
such causal relationship needs to be traced.51 It is thus impossible
to state the present law with confidence. To require a causal link
seems to impose an unnecessary technical burden upon the con-
tributor and to ignore the realities of life where it is very common
for the spouses to agree to pay different expenses.
With regard to the last proposition, it is always possible for
44. LAW COMMISSION, PUBLISHED WORKING PAPER No. 42, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, paras.
0.5, 2.35 (1971).
45. Bagnall, J. in Cowcher v. Cowcher, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 425, 429.
46. Cowcher v. Cowcher, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 425; Gissing v. Gissing [1969] 2 Ch. 85.
47. The presumption of advancement whereby property which was purchased by the
husband and put into the wife's sole name was presumed to be a gift from the husband has
now virtually disappeared.
48. P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 379 (4th ed. 1972).
49. [1969] 2 Ch. 85.
50. But cf. Lord Denning in Hazell v. Hazell, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 301, 305.
51. Id.
No. 11
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the spouses to expressly agree upon a method of holding property.
Serious problems arise, however, where there is no express mutual
intention, and one spouse attempts to prove inferred intent. In
these situations the courts are faced with the virtually impossible
task of having to determine the parties' state of mind at the time
the property was acquired. To date the requirement of a common
intention has been interpreted both restrictively and liberally
thereby making it impossible for a lawyer to determine whether a
spouse owns any share in the matrimonial home which is in the
other's sole name.52 The court's predicament in trying to determine
what is often an entirely fictitious intention of the parties is well
expressed in the following dicta of Lord Hodson: "The conception
of a normal married couple spending the long winter evenings
hammering out agreements about their possessions appears
grotesque."53
1) Statutory Innovations.
The difference between the views adopted by the House of
Lords and the Court of Appeal discussed herein reflect the confu-
sion and inconsistency which at present pervade the English sys-
tem.54 To remedy this state of affairs, piecemeal legislation has
been introduced as a half-hearted attempt to provide more cer-
tainty in the law and to more adequately define a spouse's owner-
ship rights in marital property.
The Married Women's Property Act of 196455 provides that
property saved from a housekeeping allowance for the expenses of
the matrimonial home or for other similar purposes should be
deemed to belong to the spouse equally. 6 Previously, the position
had been that if a husband provided his wife with an allowance for
housekeeping from his money, any sums not spent for such a pur-
pose remained his. Simple on its face, this statute is so riddled
with loopholes that it is seldom invoked. For example, there is
nothing in the Act to prevent a husband from giving a thrifty wife
a merely nominal allowance and buying household items himself so
52. Freeman, Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Family Property Law, 25 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 82, 94 (1972).
53. Pettit v. Pettit, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966, 987.
54. Mary Ann Glendon has expressed such a view in Glendon, Matrimonial Property:
A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 TUL. L. REV., 21, 43-45 (1974).
55. Married Women's Property Act, 1964, c. 19.
56. Id. § 1.
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that they belong to him. The word "allowance" is ambiguous. For
instance, does it cover the case where a wife has power to draw on
the husband's bank account? The scope of the phrase "other simi-
lar purposes" is also unclear. For instance, does it cover the case of
mortgage installments? Taken literally, the Act as drafted would
give a husband half share in the wife's fur coat which she has pur-
chased out of the allowance.
The Matrimonial Homes Act of 1967 5 created a statutory
right of occupation in the matrimonial home for a non-owning
spouse. Such a right is not a property right but merely a personal
right to enter into and occupy the home with leave of the court. It
is registrable as a land charge which constitutes actual notice
against third parties so that the right prevails against any person
deriving title from the property-owning spouse. The Law Commis-
sion has proposed" that the statutory right of occupation, which at
present exists only for as long as the marriage subsists, be retained
upon dissolution. The result would be that the court's powers to
make property orders upon dissolution would include the power to
deal directly with occupation rights. Such a proposal appears
sound; a non-owning spouse may need protection most when the
marriage has finally broken down, especially if given custody of the
children.
Until the enactment of Section 37 of the Matrimonial Pro-
ceedings and Property Act of 1970, 59 it was unclear whether a
spouse who had contributed to the improvement of real or personal
property was entitled to a beneficial interest in the property on the
theory of a resulting trust in the amount of his contribution. Sec-
tion 37 provides that such improvements, provided that they are of
a substantial nature shall, subject to any contrary agreement, give
the contributing spouse rights to an enlarged share of the benefi-
cial interest in the property. The question of the existence or ex-
tent of the beneficial interest of the husband or wife is determined
by the courts' application of equitable principles.
These statutory innovations in the system, particularly with
57. Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, c. 75, § 1(1). Previously the right of occupation was
based on a common law right to occupy the home for as long as the husband was obligated
to maintain his wife or to contract with her. The wife lost her right of occupation when
these obligations were severed.
58. LAw COMMISSION, THIRD REPORT ON FAMILy PROPERTY: THE MATRIMONIAL HOME
(Co-OwNERSHIP AND OCCUPATION RIGHTS) AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS, LAW COM. No. 86, para.
1.265 (1978).
59. Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, c. 45.
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regard to the rights of the non-owning spouse in the matrimonial
home, indicate judicial recognition of the need to provide more cer-
tainty in the law. At present it is difficult to define precisely a
spouse's rights of ownership. Further, it is'apparent that a uniform
body of rules operating during the marriage is needed to provide
spouses.with a sense of security and to avoid unnecessary disputes
which may otherwise result in marital breakdown.
The plight of the English homemaker during marriage is of
paramount concern. 0 Although the Court of Appeal has at times
strained the scope of Section 17 beyond the limits now recognized
as permissible, 1 it has never succeeded in making the home-
maker's purely domestic efforts the basis of beneficial entitlement
to the family assets. 2 The injustice to the homemaker has often
been pointed out: "If, on marriage, [the wife] gives up her paid
work, in order to devote herself to caring for her husband and chil-
dren, it is an unwarrantable hardship when in consequence she
finds herself in the end with nothing she can call her own." 3
Although the position of the homemaker upon divorce has now
been greatly improved" there is still no recognition of her services
during the marriage.
2) The Law Commission's Proposals.
In its first working paper 5 on family property law the Law
Commission discussed and developed two major proposals: 1) to
remedy the mechanics involved in determining the intentions of
the spouses as to ownership of the matrimonial home, and 2) to
remedy the glaring omission in the law as to non-recognition of the
homemaker's contributions to the marital relationship. The Law
Commission recognized that the principle of separation of prop-
erty, although cast in non-discriminatory terms, may reinforce
rather than remove sex-based inequality:
60. See text accompanying note 134 infra and compare this with the position of the
homemaker in California.
61. Hazell v. Hazell, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 301; Chapman v. Chapman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1367;
Appelton v. Appleton, [19651 1 W.L.R. 25; Hine v. Hine, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1124; Rimmer v.
Rimmer [1953] 1 Q.B. 63.
62. LAW COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY: A NEW APPROACH, LAW COM.
No. 52, para. 18 (1974).
63. ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, Cmd. No. 9678 (1956) (opinion of
seven members).
64. See text accompanying notes 147-215 infra.
65. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 44.
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Equality of power, which separation of property achieves, does
not of itself lead to equal opportunity to exercise that power; it
ignores the fact that a married woman, especially if she has young
children, does not in practice have the same opportunity as her
husband or as an unmarried woman to acquire property."6
Such an attitude may at first appear overly paternalistic. Yet
the Law Commission was merely recognizing the realities of mar-
ried life.6 7 Someone, usually the wife, is required to be the home-
maker, at least where there are young children. Surely this service
to the marriage is as valid as any other. Even if both spouses are
working, this does not, according to one writer, 8 detract from the
centrality of the wife-mother-housekeeper role in society: "employ-
ment does not of itself alter the status (or reduce the work) of be-
ing a housewife."69
An opposing view is that legal recognition of a homemaker's
contribution is undesirable because it will perpetuate the notion
that a wife's place is in the home. Nonetheless, the balance of fac-
tors indicates that a change in the law is desirable. To avoid per-
petuating a homemaker's role, this change should, however, be
based on sociological understanding of the husband-wife relation-
ship rather than on the notion that separation of property can only
be achieved where each spouse has made a financial contribution.
The Law Commission has focused upon property rights in the
matrimonial home in order to provide the homemaker with vested
ownership rights,70 since in most cases the matrimonial home is the
community's principal asset. The Law Commission adopted Pro-
fessor Kahn-Freund's view" ' that by its very nature, the matrimo-
nial home should be owned jointly by husband and wife. Professor
Freund emphasizes the fact that the home is used throughout the
marriage by both spouses. Joint use should, in effect, give rise to
joint ownership.
66. Id. at 7.
67. In Britain, the Department of Employment has projected that even by 1991, the
economic security rates for married women will rise only to 68 per cent for married women
aged 35-44, 75 per cent for those aged 45-54 and 62 per cent for those aged 55-59. See
Labour Force Projections, 1976 to 1991 Great Britain and the Regions, DEP'T OF EMPLOY-
MENT GAZErE 1258, 1261 (Dec. 1975).
68. A. OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK (1974).
69. Id. at 6.
70. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 44 at para. 1.86 and LAW COMMISSION, supra note
58.
71. Kahn-Freund, Matrimonial Property, Some Recent Developments, 22 MOD. L.
REv. 243, 258 (1959).
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Recently, the Law Commission proposed in a detailed report 2
(dealing exclusively with the matrimonial home) that the home
should be jointly owned by the spouses by means of a joint tenancy
in the absence of any contrary agreement.7 3 The proposal is subject
to a flaw in that a wealthy spouse would be free to invest his
money and merely rent a house thus depriving the other spouse of
any interest. Generally, however, the proposal is welcome for it
mitigates the present uncertainties in the law and, more impor-
tantly, recognizes the contribution of the homemaker to the wel-
fare of the family.
If the proposal is enacted, the relative ownership positions of
husband and wife in the matrimonial home would be analogous to
California law insofar as both spouses have a present and equal
share in the home. Yet there would also be important differences.
Under the English proposal of a joint tenancy the right of survivor-
ship would accrue upon the death of a spouse. In California the
decedent's estate is entitled to his share in the community prop-
erty, whereas the Law Commission emphasizes use of the property
as giving rise to co-ownership: the source of acquisition is the es-
sential consideration under California law. Thus it has been pro-
posed 7 4 that even property acquired prior to marriage which is
used as the matrimonial home after the marriage should be subject
to the rules of statutory co-ownership unless it has been expressly
unilaterally excluded. Property acquired prior to the marriage in
California cannot be community property absent sufficient evi-
dence of transmutation. Merely sharing its use is not sufficient per
se to transmute the separate property into community property.7 5
The difference between these two approaches lies in their underly-
ing notions. The Law Commission's proposals are based entirely
upon the concept of joint use during the marriage, whereas Califor-
nia's community property system is based upon a system of joint
acquisition during the marriage.
In general, the proposals for reform represent a positive step
76
72. LAW COMMISSION, THIRD REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY: THE MARITAL HOME (Co-
OWNERSHIP & OCCUPATIONAL RIGHTS) AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS, LAW CoM. No. 86 (1978).
73. Id. at para. 1.1.
74. Id. at para. 1.108. For a detailed examination of all the proposals contained in the
Law Commission's third report on family property see 0. Stone, Reports of the Law Com-
mission, 42 MOD. L. REv. 192 (1979).
75. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1973).




toward recognizing as inevitable some form of sharing within a sys-
tem of separation of property. The shared use of the matrimonial
home presents a prima facie case for joint ownership.77 It is diffi-
cult to see, however, why the Law Commission did not also pro-
pose joint ownership with regard to household goods, an issue also
considered in their recent report. Rather than advocating a method
of co-ownership, the Commission has proposed, upon the applica-
tion of a spouse, to order that spouse be given a right to use and
enjoy the household items actually belonging to the other..7 None-
theless, household goods are by their very nature shared as much
by the spouses as the home itself. Thus a strong argument can be
made for extending the Law Commission's proposals for co-owner-
ship of the matrimonial home to household goods.
Why then did the Law Commission not extend its proposals to
all forms of marital property?. The answer lies in the principle of
separation of property which is the foundation of English marital
property law. To extend the notion of co-ownership to all forms of
property would be tantamount to destroying the whole system of
separation, a change too drastic to be considered realistic.
Professor Kahn-Freund has advocated a distinction between
"investment assets" and "household assets" on the basis that the
mechanics of operating a system of joint ownership or common
ownership of investment property would be too cumbersome.7 9 He
argues that frequently in the case of joint ownership of investment
assets there would be disagreement between the spouses as to the
course of action to be adopted. It is feared that frequent interven-
tion of the courts would be necessary. 0 While this line of reasoning
has validity, it can be argued that the essential reason for the dis-
tinction between the two types of assets lies in the concept of shar-
ing. The marital couple does not envisage sharing investment as-
sets, whereas sharing the matrimonial home is paramount during a
harmonious marriage.
In conclusion, the recent statutory innovations of the law, the
efforts of the Court of Appeal to establish the notion of a joint
77. Joint ownership is the most common form of ownership. The proportion of spouses
buying a home in the decade 1962-71 and having it conveyed into their joint names rose
from 47% to 74%.
78. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 58 at para. 3.31.
79. Kahn-Freund, supra note 71.
80. Compare the effects of vesting joint management and control of California Commu-
nity Property in both spouses. Although the position is not entirely clear it appears that the
same problems may result. See text accompanying notes 125-130 infra.
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venture, and the latest Law Commission proposals all indicate a
growing desire to combine the notion of individualism attached to
separation of property with the communal notion of the family.
Thus it is clear that English law is slowly groping its way toward a
compromise between the ideas of separation and community.81
B. California
The principle which lies at the foundation of the community
property system is that whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of
the husband and wife shall be their common property. Regarding
property acquired during its existence, the legal theory reflects the
view that marriage is a community of which each spouse is a mem-
ber, equally contributing his or her industry to its prosperity.
8 2
California law views marriage as a kind of partnership
whereby each spouse's contribution, whether financial or through
services as a homemaker, is given equal recognition. It is a system
of community of acquisitions and gains during the marriage with
the noteworthy exception that property acquired by gift, bequest
or devise remains separate property even though acquired during
the marriage. 3 This exception is consistent with the concept of
sharing through the mutual efforts of the spouses because a gift is
not acquired through any labor of the recipient.
Damages awarded for personal injury caused to a spouse by a
third party are community property provided that the cause of ac-
tion arose during the marriage and while the parties were living
together.8 4 It is difficult to understand this application of commu-
nity principles. One explanation is that the right to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries is a community property right which has
been acquired during the marriage, and accordingly, damages
which flow from that right should likewise be treated as commu-
nity property. Such an argument appears dubious, as it rests upon
the fallacy that the right to sue is a property right. It is submitted
that when the cause of action accrues there is no "property" as
such," but rather a mere expectation of property in the form of
81. Kahn-Freund, supra note 7, at 302.
82. R. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE UNDER
THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM § 11 (1895).
83. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5107 and 5108 (West 1970).
84. Note that damages recovered by a spouse for personal injuries caused by the other
spouse are separate property. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 5126(c) (West Supp. 1980).
85. The holding of In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. App. 3d 838, 44 P.2d 561, 126 Cal.
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damages being awarded. The right to sue is purely personal, i.e., a
chose in action. Thus it is suggested that if damages for personal
injury are to be recoverable as community property at all, they
should only be so recoverable if the damages were received by the
spouse while the marriage was subsisting and while the spouses
were living together,86 and not on the basis of when the cause of
action arose.
Even the latter test appears inconsistent with the rule of com-
munity property excluding gifts, devises and bequests. Personal in-
jury damages are totally unrelated to the labor or efforts of the
recipient spouse. When then should they be deemed community?
De Funiaks7 suggests that the community should only take an in-
terest where the injury deprives the marital community of the
earnings or services of the affected spouse. It is suggested that in
this type of case there should be a pro rata apportionment of dam-
ages between the separate estate of the injured spouse and the
community. A "Van Camp" test88 should be applied whereby the
community is entitled to the future loss of earnings, with the re-
mainder of the damages being awarded to the injured spouse as his
sole property as compensation for the injury resulting and for the
pain and suffering. The proposal presents a problem of quantifying
future loss of earnings in some cases, as in the case where the
homemaking spouse is so injured that he or she cannot give the
same services to the community. In this situation it is suggested
that the courts could base their calculations upon the cost of em-
ploying the services of a third person in the home.
1) Classification of Property.
a. Transmutation
The law relating to personal injury damages flows from the
general presumption that property which is acquired during the
course of the marriage is community property.8 9 The presumption
Rptr. 633 (1976), that pensions rights which are not vested are nevertheless community
property, is distinguishable in that such rights are contractual rights derived from the terms
of the employment contract as soon as employment has commenced.
86. This was indeed the position prior to 1979. The present law applies retroactively.
87. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHAN, supra note 16 at 202-203.
88. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921). Compare the position
in relation to profits of a separate business as discussed in text accompanying notes 115-122
infra.
89. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 5110 (West Supp. 1980).
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may prove critical in cases* where English courts would regard the
form of record title as determinative 0 In California a recitation in
the title deed that property is to be the wife's "sole and separate
property" is not enough to displace the presumption."1 The pre-
sumption is rebuttable by clear evidence of a contrary intention
and the spouses remain free to contract out of the system. The
courts have recognized oral and implied contracts, very few formal
requirements exist.9 2 Even without an oral or written agreement to
transmute, the testimony of one spouse regarding his intention to
change the form of ownership may be held sufficient to uphold a
finding of transmutation.9 '
Clearly, it is desirable that certain evidence evincing the true
intentions of the parties be admissible. The problem, however, is
exactly the problem existing in English law in relation to the Mar-
ried Women's Property Act:9 4 the difficulty in attempting to deter-
mine the true intentions of the parties absent any written agree-
ment. It seems that the courts will attempt to support the notion
that the property in question is community property, particularly
with regard to property which is in joint tenancy form.9 5 Indeed
.one writer has commented that the courts have relaxed the stan-
dards of proof of intention to such an extent that "litigation and
perjury are encouraged." ' In some cases, courts have even inferred
an intention of the parties that property belongs to the community
to produce a just result.
9 7
Legislative action is needed to limit the type of evidence ad-
missible to establish transmutation. It is suggested that only "clear
and convincing" evidence should be admissible. Such a provision
would ensure that courts would in fact recognize the true inten-
90. See text accmpanying notes 39-45 supra.
91. Burdick v. Pope, 90 Nev. 28, 518 P.2d 146 (1974).
92. See Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944), holding parol evi-
dence admissible to establish that although the spouses acquired the matrimonial home as
joint tenants they intended it to be community property.
93. In re Marriage of Frapwell, 79 Cal. App. 3d 597, 130 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1975); Estate of
Cummins, 130 Cal. App. 2d 821, 280 P.2d 128 (1955).
94. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
95. Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944).
96. Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87, 95
(1961-62).
97. See United States v. Pierotti, 154 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1946), where the probate court
made an order terminating the joint tenancy so that the survivor could sell, and then the
federal court in a tax case for the same property held that the property was community
property and therefore entitled to the preferred tax treatment due to such property.
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tions of the parties while at the same time requiring that the title
which appears on the face of an instrument be upheld in the ab-
sence of a clear contrary intention.
The author disagrees with one writer's98 argument that prop-
erty in joint tenancy form should be presumed to be community
property. Such an argument not only ignores the terms of a written
instrument but results in direct contradiction of it. It is submitted
that in the interests of preserving certainty in the law, and
preventing fraud and perjury, transmutation should only be found
to have occurred where there is clear and convincing evidence.
Such evidence should not be restricted to written evidence al-
though clearly the standard that would be required would be more
difficult to meet with respect to oral evidence.
b. Tracing and Commingling
A major problem in any community property system is ascer-
taining whether property which is acquired during the marriage is
separate or community. The general presumption is that all prop-
erty acquired during a marriage is community.9 This presumption,
however, is rebuttable, by tracing the source of the funds used to
acquire the property. The tracing doctrine is based on an obvious
equity: "if a thing or right belonging to the fund is given in ex-
change for another thing or right, clearly the fund which furnished
the consideration and is thereby depleted should be reimbursed by
having the thing or right so acquired. This restores the legal equa-
tion ... ."100 Thus if a spouse is able to prove that a particular
asset acquired during the marriage was in fact purchased with sep-
arate funds then the property is separate property.
The present law with regard to reimbursement and apportion-
ment for separate property funds used as a down payment on a
community property residence is shrouded in uncertainty. In Re
Marriage of Bjornestad0 1 held that reimbursement of separate
funds used for a down payment is proper provided that the con-
tributing spouse can trace the funds.0 2 In Re Marriage of
Trantafello "0 3 held that a spouse who makes a separate property
98. Griffith, 14 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1961).
99. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980).
100. W. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMuNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 135 (1962).
101. 38 Cal. App. 3d 801, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1974).
102. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 806, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
103. 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974).
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payment on a community home is presumed to have intended a
gift. In these circumstances, the contributing spouse is "entitled to
reimbursement and to a pro rata share of increase in value only if
he or she has an express agreement with the other spouse.'" The
ability to trace funds is by itself insufficient to permit the paying
spouse reimbursement.
On the other hand, In Re Marriage of Aufmuth'0 5 stated that
a spouse who is able to trace a separate property down payment to
a community home is entitled to reimbursement for the down pay-
ment and to a pro tanto allocation of the appreciation. 10 8 The pro
tanto share is based upon a ratio between the separate property
down payment and the amount of the loan.
These cases cannot be distinguished or reconciled on any ra-
tional basis. Trantafello is consistent with the principle that one
using separate funds for the community purposes is deemed to
have made a gift to the community absent an agreement between
the parties. It is also consistent with Section 5110 of the California
Civil Code.10 7 On the other hand, Aufmuth and Bjornestad are
consistent with the principle of tracing which allows a spouse to
recoup separate property. Aufmuth provides the most equitable
solution. The adoption of the Trantafello approach may deter a
spouse from expending his separate property for community pur-
poses. The California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in an
unpublished case108 on these issues and it is hoped that they are
resolved in favor of Aufmuth.' 9
104. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 543-45, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 563-64.
105. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, (1979).
106. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 456-57, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
107. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1979).
108. In re Marriage of White, No. 45146 (Cal. App., filed Sept. 26, 1979), appeal dock-
eted, No. 24097 (Cal. 1980).
109. In August 1980 in In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808 (1980) a unanimous
supreme court held that a separate contribution to the purchase of a family residence ac-
quired after marriage is presumed to be a gift to the community absent an agreement that
the contribution is to remain separate. The decisions in In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 446, 162 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979) and in In re Marriage of Bjornestad, 38 Cal. App. 3d
801 113 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1974) were expressly disapproved to the extent that they are incon-
sistent. The court instead adopted the approach taken in In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94
Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. Rpt. 556 (1979).
In Lucas title was taken in joint names, thus invoking the special presumption con-
tained in Cal. Civ. Code § 5110 that a single-family residence acquired in joint tenancy form
is presumed to be community property for the purposes of legal separation or dissolution.
The court held that tracing alone could not rebut this presumption. Compare this to the
position rebutting the general presumption of community property where tracing is suffi-
cient. It is clear, however, that by expressly disapproving not only Bjornestad where title
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The problem of classification of assets is accentuated when
community funds are commingled with separate funds. In this sit-
uation a non-statutory presumption (i.e., the "family expense" pre-
sumption) charges all living expenses paid from a commingled ac-
count against the community property.110 If it is established that
the asset in question was purchased at a time when family living
expenses equaled or exceeded the community income, the asset
must necessarily have been purchased with separate funds and is
therefore separate property.
It has been observed"' that the family expense presumption
can lead to unjust results where one spouse possesses substantial
separate wealth. Either spouse with separate income is free to es-
tablish a high standard of living for the community which may,
applying the family expense presumption, expend all of the com-
munity income. The result will be that all assets acquired by the
wealthy spouse during the time when the community income had
been exhausted will be his separate property.
The problem has been partially alleviated by See v. See.1 1 2 In
that case it was argued on behalf of the husband that, since the
total living expenses throughout the marriage had exceeded his or
her community property income, all the remaining assets must
necessarily have been purchased with his separate funds and there-
fore be his separate property. Rejecting the "total recapitulation
was similarly taken in joint names, but also Aufmuth where the home was community, the
court intended the scope of its decision to extend to all family residences.
The previous confusion still has not been entirely resolved. Must an agreement that
contributions remain separate be expressed? The court does not provide a clear answer.
Manuel, J., used the words "agreement" and "understanding" synonymously, which indi-
cates that an implied agreement may be sufficient. Whether the special presumption apply-
ing to joint tenancies still controls when the residence is purchased prior to the marriage
will also be a matter for speculation until the decision in In re Marriage of White (S.F.
#24097) (1980).
A significant part of the Aufmuth decision still remains, for the court in Lucas added
that, once a contrary agreement is established, the Aufmuth pro rata apportionment
formula should be adopted. Express approval of the so-called "Lucas/Aufmuth" formula
was given in a yet more recent supreme court decision, In re Marriage of Moore, 80 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 2861 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30, 1980).
110. In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. App. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975);
Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116, 264 P.2d 626 (1953); See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d
778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
111. Helms, Never Marry a Rich Man: The Lesson of Beam v. Bank of America, A
California Apportionment Case, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 121 (1972-73); 19 STAN. L. REv. 661
(1966-67).
112. 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
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approach", 113 the court held that the relevant time to apply the
family expense presumption is at the date each particular asset
was acquired. Furthermore, records are required to show the bal-
ance of the community income and expenditures at the time each
asset is purchased.
By focusing attention on the balance of community income
and expenses at the time an asset was acquired rather than at the
dissolution of the marriage, the See decision makes it more diffi-
cult for a spouse to rebut the presumption that all property ac-
quired during marriage belongs to the community and thus more
difficult to raise the family expense presumption. However, the
case has not solved the problem of a wealthy spouse reaping the
benefits of a high standard living, draining all the community in-
come and purchasing property which is not divisible upon termina-
tion of the marriage. One writer 1 4 has advocated the allocation of
living expenses between community and separate funds on a pro
rata basis. It is suggested that such an approach would achieve a
more equitable result. It would also be simple to compute and dis-
pense with the present necessity of having to keep detailed records
at every stage of the marriage.
2) Profits of Separate Property.
Ordinarily, rents, issues and profits from separate property are
themselves separate property.11 5 But when separate capital and
community efforts are combined to produce a profit traceable to
the separate capital, income from such property is allocated be-
tween community and separate property in accordance with the
relative extent of the efforts of the spouse and his capital invest-
ment respectively.
Two alternative tests in calculating the apportionment can be
applied. The "Pereira" test,116 in the absence of other evidence,
allocates simple interest of 7 % on the capital to the separate prop-
erty and the balance is treated as community. By comparison,
under the "Van Camp,"'"" test the reasonable value of the hus-
band's services is determined and allocated to the community and
the balance is treated as separate property.
113. 19 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1966-67).
114. Helms, supra note 111, at 138.
115. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West Supp. 1980).
116. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
117. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
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While there are disadvantages in using either test, it is diffi-
cult to see how the courts can evoke an entirely satisfactory test to
quantify what is essentially a non-quantifiable value attributable
to a spouse's skill and efforts. The major disadvantage of the Per-
eira test is that the 7% interest rule is seldom a realistic measure-
ment of capital growth. The rate will fluctuate according to the
particular circumstances, such as inflation and economic condi-
tions. The main disadvantage of the Van Camp test is that the
salary fixed is often unreliable"' especially in the case where the
husband runs his own business:
[T]he trouble is... that such a salary is not set on a competitive
basis. Th e husband is at both ends of the bargain. He runs the*
business and hires himself as manager .... The husband on the
one hand acting like an owner, and wishing to spend as little as
possible and build up as big a surplus as possible in the business,
will take out of the business a very small amount, much less than
any estimate of the worth of his services. On the other hand, if he
owns only 51% of the stock, he has control and may wish to
abuse it by allotting to himself a salary much larger than his ser-
vices are worth. In both cases this basis for the part that is to be
given the community is apt to be unrealistic.11 '
It appears that in practice the application of either test does
not often result in any actual apportionment to the community.
The application of the Van Camp formula must not ignore the
family expense presumption. For example, if the value of annual
community expenses exceeds the attributed value of a spouse's an-
nual salary derived from his separate business, there will be no
community income to apportion. 20 It has been suggested 21 that an
118. E.g., in Tassi v. Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 691, 325 P.2d 872, 878 (1958), a mere
$15,000 per annum was attributed to the husband's services as general manager of a whole-
sale meat business which was wholly owned by him.
119. W. BROCKELBANK, supra note 100.
120. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971).
Although See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966), strictly applies
only to cases where a spouse has voluntarily commingled separate and community income in
a single account, the writer's view is that it will be extended to barring the total recapitula-
tion approach in applying the Van Camp test. The court, however, has expressed no opinion
on this point to date. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d at n. 6.
Application of the Pereira formula to the case of a modestly profitable business may
result in all the profit element being exhausted in calculating the interest attributable as the
spouse's separate property. Trial courts seem to apply either test arbitrarily.
121. W. REPPY and W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 264
(1975).
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alternative approach would be to compute the results under both
tests and then select whichever test is more favorable to the com-
munity.122 The crux of the problem again lies in the failure of Cali-
fornia community property law to adequately deal with the situa-
tion where there is great separate wealth but little or no
community assets. Operation of either the Van Camp or Pereira
tests, combined with the use of the family expense presumption,
may leave a homemaking spouse destitute while the property-own-
ing spouse can reap the benefits of a luxurious lifestyle at the ex-
pense of the community. It is suggested that adoption of the rule
that income from separate property is community would at least
partially alleviate this situation.
3) Management and Control.
In 1973 a major change in California community property law
was effected. From January 1, 1975, either spouse has management
and control of the community property.12 s No longer is full man-
agement and control vested in the husband; the wife's equal rights
to management have been recognized. 124 There are certain restric-
tions imposed upon each spouse's sole managerial powers which re-
sult in what is essentially a joint and several management scheme
under which either spouse is free to make his own decision affect-
ing the community in everyday transactions, but has to obtain the
consent of the other spouse for more important decisions. With re-
spect to real property, both spouses are required to join in execut-
ing any instrument by which community real property or interest
contained therein is leased for longer than one year, or is sold, con-
veyed or encumbered. Neither spouse can sell, convey or encumber
the furniture or fixtures of the home without the written consent
of the other spouse.
125
This system of joint and several control is based upon the as-
sumption that each spouse is competent to make decisions affect-
ing the community. It further presumes trust and communication
between the spouses. One major problem is that the law does not
provide a solution in the event of disagreement between the
spouses. 126 If, for example, the husband calls his stockbroker and
122. Id.
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
124. The pre-1975 position is not discussed in this essay.
125. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125(c), 5127 (West Cure. Supp. 1979).
126. But see CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) which states "[a]
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asks him to sell the community stock immediately and two min-
utes later the wife calls asking him not to sell, what is the broker
to do? The hypothetical can be extended to numerous areas of
married life where conflict may arise. The problem is one of com-
mon competitive control. The results are inevitable: confusion, ex-
pense and frustration.127 Yet the possible alternative to a system of
joint management and control would not be desirable because of
the underlying philosophical notions about the nature of marriage.
A joint management system requiring consultation and agreement
between the spouses for all transactions presumes that bad faith
and lack of trust are the norm.
128
a. Mismanagement
A closely related problem in this area is mismanagement of
community assets. It has been stated that the potential for mis-
management or dissipation has been compounded since both
spouses now have an equal opportunity to abuse their respective
powers of management to defeat the other's interest in the commu-
nity assets.129 The question remains how far pre-1975 case law will
continue to apply in view of the new statutory "good faith" stan-
dard 30 requiring that each spouse shall act in good faith with re-
spect to the other spouse in the management and control of the
community property.
Prior to 1975 the case law implied that the husband in exercis-
ing sole management and control did not have to act as a trus-
tee.131 The standard of care appeared to be more limited although
it has never been satisfactorily or uniformly defined by the courts.
In Weinberg v. Weinberg8 2 the test for mismanagement was said
spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a business which is commu-
nity personal property has the sole management and control of the business or interest."
The statute, however, fails to deal with the situation where the business is built on commu-
nity real property.
127. See Comment, California's New Community Property Law-Its Effect on Inter-
spousal Mismanagement Litigation, 5 PAC. L.J. 723 (1974).
128. Bingaman, The Effects of An Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico Sys-
tem of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management and Control, 3
NEW MExico L. REV. 11, 43 (1973).
129. Comment, supra note 127.
130. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
131. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971),
which expressly cast doubt on dicta in Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d 247,
15 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1961), that a husband had the duties of a trustee.
132. 67 Cal. App. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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to be whether the husband had obtained an "unfair advantage" by
reason of his powers of management. The test was expressly ap-
proved and followed in Williams v. Williams1 3 3 where the husband
was ordered to reimburse the community for funds which he had
liquidated immediately prior to the divorce.
Whether the unfair advantage principle will continue to be ap-
plied following the 1975 legislation remains to be seen. It is argua-
ble that there is a difference between the "unfair advantage" test
and the "good faith" test. While the former involves an objective
evaluation of all the circumstances and effects of the action in-
volved, a strict application of the latter test appears to involve
merely a subjective evaluation as to whether the spouse acted in
the belief that what he did was for the benefit of the community.
The courts are likely to adopt a broad interpretation of the
good faith requirement and incorporate the Weinberg test to cir-
cumvent the evidentiary problems of disproving good faith. It is
uncertain whether the test will also be extended to include negli-
gent or grossly negligent acts. The effect of such an interpretation
would be to presuppose that each spouse's duties are in fact
equivalent to that of a trustee. If the legislature had envisioned
such a duty, it would have surely been express.
These unanswered questions highlight the need for a close ex-
amination of the area of mismanagement. A statutory definition of
"good faith" is required to resolve the present uncertainties. The
writer is also of the opinion that there should be a maximum ceil-
ing in the value of an asset which a spouse can dispose of without
obtaining the consent of the other in order to protect the commu-
nity from abuse of the good faith standard.
b. Effects of Equal Management
Is the novel concept of equal management and control as revo-
lutionary as it may at first appear? The fact the legislation has in
principle recognized the wife's present and vested right in commu-
nity assets is certainly a positive step in eliminating the previous
sex-based discrimination which resulted from the husband having
sole management. In reality, however, the legislation may not pro-
duce any significant impact in the case of a normal marriage where
spouses communicate easily.
133. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
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From the perspective of the homemaker" 4 the concept of
equal management becomes a fiction. When the husband receives
his regular paycheck and pays it into his own account, in what
sense can it be said that the wife actually has "equal" management
rights to the community property earnings?13 5 In this situation the
wife is in little better position as a practical matter than the home-
making wife in England. Although she does have rights of both
ownership and control she has the virtually impossible task of at-
tempting to exercise rights to earnings which she does not even
see. Further, in the absence of specific proof of mismanagement
she has no recourse to the courts because the husband has acted
perfectly within his rights as equal manager of his earnings.
c. Equal Credit Opportunity
One major practical consequence of the equal management
and control provisions is that a married woman should now be able
to engage in credit transactions on an equal footing with her hus-
band. Previously, the husband's signature was frequently required
before extending credit to the wife. There is now a specific statu-
tory provision which prohibits the denial of credit on the basis of
sex.1 36 The exact scope of the provision is unclear but appears to
be limited to cases where the wife has earnings. The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA),3 7 and regulations promulgated
thereunder, 138 has clarified the position by requiring in effect equal
credit opportunity for an unemployed wife provided that the com-
munity itself is worthy of credit. Thus both spouses should now be
regarded as equally and independently worthy of credit; in no
circumstances should a husband's co-signature be required.1 39
4) Debts and Torts.
The equal management and control provisions have resulted
134. In 1975 55.6% of married women in the United States did not work outside of the
home for compensation. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
358-59 (1976).
135. See Bingaman, Equal Credit Opportunity, The Impact of Equal Management of
Community Property, 4 CoMMuNrrY PROP. J. 157, 158 (1977).
136. CAL. CiV. CoDE § 1812.30(b) (West Supp. 1980).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(e) (1977).
138. 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.13 (1980)
139. For a detailed discussion of the ECOA, see Baker and Taubman, The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act: The Effect of the Regulations on the Poor, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
543 (1975).
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in a change in the law in relation to liability for contract debts and
for torts. Under present law the community is liable for any pre or
postnuptial contractual obligation incurred by either spouse after
January 1, 1975, except that the earnings of one spouse cannot be
reached to satisfy the other's prenuptial debts.140 The separate
property of either spouse is not liable for the other's contractual
debts, whether incurred before or after marriage, except to the ex-
tent necessary to fulfill their respective obligations of support.141
By comparison, under the English common law principles of sepa-
ration of property neither spouse can be held liable for the debts of
the other.142
The extent of community liability for a spouse's tort during
the marriage depends upon whether the tortfeasor was performing
an activity for the benefit of the community. If this requirement is
satisfied then any judgment or settlement must first be satisfied
from community assets. If these are insufficient, the tortfeasor's
separate property must be used.143 The position is reversed if the
tortfeasor was not acting for the benefit of the community. Any
judgment or settlement must first be satisfied from his separate
property.14 4 With regard to prenuptial torts, the rule is the same as
with prenuptial contracts insofar as the earnings of the non-
tortfeasor cannot be reached.
The liability of the community for prenuptial debts and torts
is subject to dispute. The law seems inconsistent with the funda-
mental principle in California community property law that only
property acquired after marriage is community property. If a
spouse can bring property into the marriage and retain it as his or
her separate property, it is both just and reasonable that he or she
should remain solely liable for his or her prenuptial obligations
and that the community resources should not be tapped.
The liability of the community for debts and torts of one
spouse committed during the marriage is consistent with the no-
tion of partnership. Yet, is it fair that a spouse may incur unlim-
ited community obligations without the consent or knowledge of
the other spouse? In the interests of protecting the community
there should be a maximum ceiling on the value of a debt which a
140. CAL. CIV. CoDE §§ 5116, 5120 (West Supp. 1980).
141. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5120, 5121 (West Supp. 1980).
142. See text accompanying notes 11-18 supra.
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122(b)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
144. Id. at (b)(2).
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spouse can incur without the written consent of the other. With
regard to tortious acts, the requirement that the tortfeasor was act-
ing for the benefit of the community is ambiguous. Suppose, for
example, that a husband is on his way to the bank to draw out
some separate property funds which he intends to use for commu-
nity expenses and negligently injures a pedestrian-is the comm-
munity liable? Upon strict statutory interpretation the result may
indeed turn on the character of the funds in his bank account or
the purpose for which they are intended to be used. In the absence
of statutory clarification, we may consider case law in other com-
munity property states (e.g., Washington and Arizona) where
courts look to all the surrounding circumstances in determining
whether the tortfeasor was in fact acting for the benefit of the
community. The requirement has often been interpreted loosely in
order in impute liability to the community.
14 5
In summary, the operation of the California community prop-
erty system is not beyond criticism. The enormous complexity of
the law, with particular regard to commingling, the liability of the
community for pre-marital debts and torts, the liability of the
community to personal injury damages and the uncertainties sur-
rounding the apportionment of separate property profits all con-
tribute to the disadvantages of such a system. While equal man-
agement and control provisions are an important vehicle in
overcoming sex-based discrimination, they still have not solved the
problem of mismanagement of community funds.
III. TERMINATION
A. Divorce: Fixed or Discretionary Distribution?
The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973146 (MCA) was originally
considered by the Law Commission to incorporate a deferred com-
munity property system. While it fails in this respect, it does cre-
ate a statutory mode of equitable division of property upon
dissolution.
The time at which property was acquired is irrelevant. It
makes no difference for the purpose of division that property was
145. E.g., in Moffitt v. Krueger, 11 Wash. 2d 658, 120 P.2d 512 (1941), the wife took a
community automobile on pleasure trip, allowed a friend to drive, and knocked down a
pedestrian. The community was held liable for the wife's negligence since her activities were
said to be for the benefit of the community.
146. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18.
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acquired before the marriage. 147 All property which is owned by
each spouse individually or jointly is available for distribution be-
tween them upon a decree of divorce, annuilment, or judicial sepa-
ration. The irrelevancy of the time of acquisition is open to criti-
cism as a spouse who has accumulated wealth before the marriage
may lose much of it upon divorce. Nonetheless, the law seems con-
sistent with the basic priniciple of separation of property, i.e., that
marriage should have no effect on the spouse's property rights.
The MCA contains a list of factors which the court must con-
sider before making a property order upon divorce. 148 The objec-
tive is "to place the parties, so far as it is practicable. . . and just
to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if
the marriage had not broken down. 1 49 While a laudable goal, this
"make whole" provision is seldom achieved in the case of the aver-
age lower-middle class family with few major assets.
It is expressly provided that in considering the contribution of
each spouse to the welfare of the family, the contribution of the
homemaking spouse cannot be ignored.150 The provision indicates
the legislature's awareness of the huge gap in the English system
which fails to recognize the value of the homemaker's services dur-
ing the marriage. 15' Rather than make a fundamental change in
property law during the marriage, the English legislature chose to
enact a provision which mandated retrospective recognition of
these services upon divorce. The provision is hardly an adequate
substitute for vesting a homemaking spouse with full ownership
147. Daubney v. Daubney, 120 Sol J. 330 (1976).
148. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 25(I), lists the factors to which the
court is to have regard as follows:
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the
parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the
marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including
any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;
(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the
parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the disso-
lution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring. The court
is also required to have regard to the parties' conduct.
149. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 25.
150. Id. § 25(I).
151. See text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.
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rights in marital property during the marriage. It operates rather
as a benign, overly paternalistic approach which will only serve to
further diminish the pride of the homemaker. A wife's contribution
as homemaker does not confer upon her any property rights even
upon dissolution. The MCA is strictly not a property statute: it
does not alter the legal rules which determine ownership of prop-
erty. Thus, with regard to the homemaker, courts are confined to
evaluating her contribution in deciding whether to make a discre-
tionary transfer of any part of the earning spouse's property.
By contrast, the California system declares existing property
rights upon divorce and the courts are thus required to order an
equal division of all community property.152 They have no jurisdic-
tion over the separate property of the spouse.153 The Supreme
Court has held" that California Civil Code Section 4800(a) does
not automatically require an "in kind" division; instead one com-
munity asset may be set off against another. The trial court has
broad discretion in dividing the assets and in some cases (e.g., a
close company) a straight "in kind" requirement could invite
financial disaster. Thus as long as the results of any division are
equal, the statutory requirements will be satisfied.1 55
California Civil Code Section 4800(b) provides that the court,
where economic circumstances warrant, may award any asset to
one party on such conditions as it deems proper to effect a sub-
stantially equal division of the property. This provision is most
often involved where the matrimonial home is the principal com-
munity asset. The recent case of In Re Marriage of Duke '1 56 has
broadened the scope of the section by holding that where there are
young children, the court can consider not only adverse economic
impact, but also the emotional and social effects upon the children
which would result from loss of an established family home. It re-
mains to be seen whether a wife's emotional attachment to a long-
time residence will also be a cognisable factor in the absence of any
minor children. Duke indicates a growing awareness that a rigid
equal division of community property may be unworkable in cases
where there are few community assets. It is hoped that the realistic
152. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1980).
153. Robinson v. Robinson, 65 Cal. App. 2d 118, 150 P.2d 7 (1944).
154. In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979);
In re Marriage of Fink, 25 Cal App. 3d 877 (1978).
155. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800(a) (West 1973).
156. 101 Cal. App. 3d 146, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1980).
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approach of the Duke court will be followed and expanded in fu-
ture decisions.
1) Misconduct.
In California conduct of the spouses is irrelevant in dividing
the community property. English law has also progressed a long
way from the fault-divorce equation but the insertion of one statu-
tory factor which requires the court to have regard to the spouse's
conduct indicates that traces still remain.157 The impact of such a
provision has however, been severely curtailed by the case of
Wachtel v. Wachtel' 58 which held that conduct should only be
taken into account when it is "gross and obvious." These dicta
were clarified in Harnett v. Harnett'59 where the court said that
conduct must be "obvious and gross in the sense that the party
concerned must be plainly seen to have willfully persisted in con-
duct, or a course of conduct, calculated to destroy the marriage in
circumstances in which the other party is substantially blame-
less.' '6e0 It is clear from these cases that, despite the plain language
of the MCA, conduct will rarely be considered. 16 1 That conduct
should not generally be taken into account is consistent with the
humanization of the divorce laws in England following the intro-
duction of irretrievable breakdown as the sole ground of divorce
and the rejection of the concept of matrimonial offense. 6 2
Should California enact a similar provision thus enabling a
court to vary the division of the community on account of con-
duct? One's initial reaction may be to answer affirmatively on the
basis that if one spouse is totally to blame for the breakdown then
he should endure some financial hardship. However, it is important
to remember that, in mandating an equal division of the commu-
nity, the legislature is merely declaring each spouse's vested owner-
ship rights. The enactment of a discretionary power for courts to
adjust property rights upon considerations of conduct is funda-
mentally inconsistent with a system which recognizes the existence
157. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 25(I).
158. [1973] 2 W.L.R. 366.
159. [1973] 3 W.L.R. 1.
160. Id. at 601.
161. For a case where the wife was refused a property order on the grounds of her gross
and obvious misconduct which the court found to be wholly responsible for the breakdown,
see Cuzner v. Underdown, 117 Sol J. 465 (1973).




of fixed rights. Therefore any consideration of conduct is appropri-
ate only in common law jurisdictions which provide for a wholly
discretionary method of distribution upon divorce.
2) Practical Solutions.
Upon dissolution, the essential difference between California
and English marital property law turns upon California's
mandatory mode of division of community property vis-A-vis Eng-
land's discretionary mode of separate property division. However
fundamental such a distinction may be in terms of legal theory, the
practical consequences of each system are often analogous.
Considering the factors under the MCA,163 English courts are
now adopting common sense solutions which, in the case of the
average lower-middle class family, will often produce results simi-
lar to those under California law. As an example, it may be noted
that courts are reluctant to uproot young children from the matri-
monial home. Thus the spouse who has custody (usually the wife)
will invariably be given exclusive possession of the home until the
children have completed their education. An order of sale follows
directly thereafter, the proceeds to be split between the spouses in
such proportions as the court sees fit.' Occasionally a property
settlement order gives a life interest in the home to the wife, with
remainder to the children. To tie up the capital in this way, how-
ever, is generally not the best solution where cash flow problems
exist.
This method of giving the custodial spouse exclusive posses-
sion of the matrimonial home and postponing sale also exists in
California. For example, in In Re Marriage of Bosemanl 5 the
court ordered equal division of the matrimonial home but directed
that the home should not be sold until the youngest child had
reached majority, married, or otherwise become emancipated.
The results of the operation of the two systems will, then,
often be similar. They will, however, differ where a particular vari-
able is regarded by an English judge as so significant as to affect
the property allocation. For example, where the parties have only
been married a very short time a judge may be reluctant to dispose
163. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18.
164. Such an order was made in Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1557,
(sale proceeds ordered to be split one-third to husband and two-thirds to wife).
165. 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973).
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of the matrimonial home in the aforementioned manner. In mak-
ing a property distribution a judge begins with a rule of thumb
known as the "one-third rule" whereby the wife is entitled to one-
third of the joint capital. 66 The actual amount awarded may be
greater or less than this amount in accordance with all the statu-
tory factors. Lord Denning in Wachtel 67 stated that the reasons
for taking one-third of the joint capital as the starting point were
based upon the assumption that the husband will always have the
greater expenses after dissolution; not only must he provide sup-
port for the children but he will have to employ a housekeeper.
The implied assumption that a woman will never have such ex-
penses is totally outmoded. It illustrates overbroad, stereotypical
notions about a woman's societal role. If a female divorcee goes out
to work following the divorce why then should she not also employ
a housekeeper? Fortunately the position adopted by judges today
is that they will not rigidly adhere to the one-third rule. Instead
most courts now adopt a more realistic and practical view in divid-
ing property, depending upon the circumstances of the individual
case.
3) Relative Effects of Each System
It can be seen that the English system, although less predict-
able than the California system, has the enormous advantage of
flexibility. Consideration of all the salient facts allows the courts to
reach a conclusion that purports to be just and equitable. The
principle of flexibility is preserved in the Law Commission's pro-
posals regarding the matrimonial home. 68 It has been proposed 69
that the court should continue to have jurisdiction to alter existing
property rights in the home. The inclusion of such a proposal ap-
pears to undermine the essential aim of the Law Commission's re-
cent working paper, which is to provide each spouse with the se-
curity of a fixed ownership right in the home. Indeed, the
proposal's impact upon English property law would be weakened
considerably if such a right should obtain during the marriage,
when it may not assume great significance, and yet be subject to
variation upon divorce, when the desire for a degree of certainty is
166. Ackerman v. Ackerman, [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1253; Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 2
W.L.R. 366. The one-third rule is also applied in computing the amount of spousal support.
167. [1973] 2 W.L.R. at 376.
168. See text accompanying notes 60-65 supra.




Equal division of the community is consistent with the philo-
sophical notion of a partnership which underlies the California sys-
tem. In cases where there is little or no community property to
divide upon dissolution that the basic defect of the California com-
munity property system is glaringly apparent. Since the courts lack
jurisdiction over separate property,17 0 a spouse with no resources of
his own will be left without sufficient capital and solely reliant on
support payments. This writer endorses the view that "[a] marital
community without community property, but with considerable
separate wealth, does not fulfill the promise on which community
property states pride themselves: that the non-monetary contribu-
tion of one spouse is. . .to be given legal recognition through an
entitlement in the property of the other spouse.
1 7 1
The fact that a spouse may be forced to alter his or her posi-
tion upon marriage (e.g., by having to stay in the home to look
after the children), and the danger of the other spouse dissipating
community assets, enhances the need for reform in property divi-
sion in dissolution cases where there are few community assets.
Judges in California should be given statutory flexibility to award
a proportion of one spouse's separate property to the other where
it appears just and equitable to do so. Factors to be taken into
account should include the duration of the marriage, contribution
of a spouse as homemaker and the expectations of the spouses.
Such a reform would be wholly consistent with the sharing concept
which underlies the community property system.
4) Ante-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Settlements
Upon dissolution English courts may make an order extin-
guishing or reducing the interest of either spouse under any such
settlement.17 2 The spouses cannot oust the court's jurisdiction, nor
fetter the court's authority by express provisions in the settlement
as to how the property is to be held if the marriage terminates. 17 3
170. Compare this with other community property states such as Arizona and Texas
which provide for an equitable division of community property upon dissolution.
171. Bodenheimer, The Community Without Community Property: The Need for Leg-
islative Attention to Separate-Property Marriages Under Community Property Laws, 8
CAL. W.L. REv. 381, 414 (1972).
172. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, §§ 24 (1)(c) & (d).
173. See Egerton v. Egerton, [1949] 2 ALL E.R. 238 at 242; Prinsep v. Prinsep, [1930]
P. 35 at 49; Woodcock v. Woodcock, 111 L.T.R. 924 (1914). The contrary decision in Stone
v. Stone, 3 S. AND Ta. 372 (1864) cannot now be regarded as good law.
No. 11
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
It is well established that property provisions contained in ante or
post-nuptial settlements in California are binding upon divorce
courts. 17 4 The question remains whether such provisions retain
separate legal status upon dissolution, or are merged into the de-
cree with the result that the partners can no longer resort to the
separation agreement. Such a merger will depend upon the inten-
tions of the parties; whether the agreement is presented to the
court; whether it is incorporated in the decree; and whether it con-
tains any provision as to merger. 175
Assuming that an agreement is valid in its formation in Eng-
land, the possibility of variation by an English court operates as a
severe curtailment to the basic freedom to contract. The English
law in relation to the modifiability of pre and post-nuptial agree-
ments is subject to even closer scrutiny when it is compared with
the law relating to lump sum and property transfer orders made
upon divorce. Such orders are final and binding upon the par-
ties.1 76 Since there is no logical difference between the two, both
agreements should be equally binding upon the courts and upon
the parties.
B. Annulment
By definition, a nullity decree to void a marriage1  results in
the conclusion that no valid marriage took place. Thus a discussion
of marital property rights upon annulment is not strictly within
the scope of this essay. However, the fact that the parties purport
to live together in a marital state renders such a discussion appro-
priate. This mode of living situation should be distinguished from
both a meretricious union,17 8 whereby two people live together
174. Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947). See also CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4811 (West 1980).
175. See A LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS (1978) for a
discussion on merger.
176. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 31 which provides for variation of certain
orders such as periodical payments.
177. A void marriage is one which will be regarded by every court in any case in which
the existence of the marriage is in issue as never having taken place. A voidable marriage is
regarded by every court as valid and subsisting until the court annuls it. In England a void-
able marriage is treated as if it had existed up to the time of the decree whereas CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4429 (West 1980) provides that the parties thereto are considered never to have
been married, thus blurring the distinction between void and voidable marriages.
178. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), which
followed a series of earlier cases is now auth rity for the proposition that a party may
recover financial provision from another where the two have lived together in nonmarital
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outside marriage both knowing that they are not married, and
from common law marriages,1  which have been abolished in both
England and California.
Upon a nullity decree, English courts are vested with exactly
the same powers to make property orders under the MCA as upon
a divorce decree, so that the court can make transfers of property,
lump sum and variation of settlement orders. Property allocation
is again entirely discretionary and the statutory factors contained
in the MCA180 must be taken into account.
It bears reiteration that financial orders are not dependent
upon the guilt of a respondent "spouse". Although partition on
some grounds may be based upon the fault of the respondent (for
example, the latter's willful refusal to consummate the mar-
riage),181 that does not prevent the court from making a property
order in favor of the respondent spouse's view of all the circum-
stances of the case. While there is virtually no casq law because of
the predominance of divorce decrees over nullity decrees, one
writer has commented upon the factors which will particularly af-
fect property allocation upon an annulment in England:
Obviously the parties' knowledge and belief of the defect at the
time of the ceremony will be of particular importance ... [T]he
court may be reluctant to make an order in favor of a party who
has contracted a marriage knowing it to be void; on the other
hand, it must be remembered that if she or he has previously
married and divorced, any periodical payments ordered on the di-
vorce will automatically come to an end and her sole source of
support, for the future will be the other party to the void
marriage.18
2
Thus it appears that the presence of a bona fide belief in the
validity of the marriage will be an important factor in considering
allocation of property. Additionally, a party's conduct will be rele-
vant where it is "gross and obvious."1 83 Arguably, the deception of
deliberately inducing someone into a void marriage would amount
to gross and obvious misconduct, but neither fault nor the subjec-
cohabitation on the basis of an express or implied contract or upon equitable considerations.
No English court has yet made any similar ruling.
179. A common law marriage involved no ceremony, merely a promise to be husband
and wife either per verba de futuro or per verba de praesenti.
180. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 25(I).
181. Id. § 12(b).
182. P. BROMLEY, FAMmY LAW 557 (5th ed. 1976).
183. [1973] 2 W.L.R. 366.
No. 1]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tive knowledge of a party preclude obtaining financial relief.
Upon annulment California bases property recovery exclu-
sively on the parties' intent. If both parties are aware of the defect
at the time of the ceremony no property award can be made on the
theory that as no valid marriage ever existed there can therefore be
no community property to divide. 1 4 Where, however, there is a pu-
tative marriage, recovery is possible. A putative marriage takes
place where either or both parties have a bona fide belief that the
marriage is valid.185 No particular form of marriage ceremony is
required; even a good faith belief that a common law marriage is
valid suffices to make the believer a putative spouse.188 Statutory
law provides that the court shall equally divide property acquired
during the union which would have been community property if
the union had not been void or voidable.1 17 Such property is
termed quasi-marital property.2
88
Under a putative marriage theory, the essential element for re-
covery is the presence of good faith on the part of one or both of
the parties. 89 Most case law has held that only the innocent party
may so recover, although the law on this point is at present uncer-
tain.1 0 Any distinction made between guilt and innocence, while
valid in some cases, may not always bar a successful property claim
by a blameworthy spouse. Certainly in cases where the guilty
"spouse" is already married it would be grossly unfair to allow the
bigamist to benefit from the deliberate deception. 9' But what of
184. States are, however, increasingly providing for alimony awards upon annulment
where both parties know of the defect at the time of the ceremony. An award based upon
contractual or equitable considerations may be possible. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin 18 Cal.
3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
185. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (West 1980).
186. Sancha v. Arnold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952).
187. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (West 1980).
188. 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952).
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West 1980). As to the effect of the section upon prior
remedies, see Luther and Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1972).
190. See In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), which
held, inter alia, that a "guilty" putative spouse has a right to one-half of the quasi-marital
property. The court in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976) has refused to apply the reasoning in Cary but did not overrule the decision. Writers
have criticized the reasoning in Cary, see Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin, Preserving the
Options, 65 CALiF. L. REv. 937, 945 (1977), Laughran & Laughran, Property and Inheri-
tance Rights and Putative Spouses in California: Selected Problems and Suggested Solu-
tions, 11 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 45, 48 (1977-78).
191. It has already been suggested that such conduct would also bar recovery in
England. See text accompanying notes 172-175 supra.
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less clear cut cases such as when a spouse knows that he is impo-
tent at the time of the marriage? 192 Is it still fair to talk in terms of
guilt and innocence? Where the particular defect is involuntary it
is neither just nor reasonable to impute guilt; both parties should
be able to seek a property order upon annulment as is possible
under English law.
The problem of multiple claimants has not been significant in
England because the courts have been able to produce just results
in each particular case in accordance with all the circumstances.
Before 1971, the problem of a legal spouse and a putative spouse
bringing conflicting claims in California with regard to the marital
and quasi-marital property, respectively, was considerable. The
problem has now been alleviated by legislation (in favor of the pu-
tative spouse) providing that earnings and accumulations of either
spouse, living separate and apart from one another, are separate
property.193 As a result the legal spouse will usually have no claim
once the parties have separated. 194 Multiple claimant problems
may, however, continue to arise in atypical situations. 95 In the ab-
sence of any statutory guidelines, equitable principles will be ap-
plied which will often result in an equal division of property accu-
mulated between the two innocent wives"9 ' during the active phase
of bigamy. Where the two legal spouses separate and later recon-
cile after the putative marriage has taken place, acquisitions dur-
ing each period must be considered separately.
197
C. Death
Following the enactment of the Law Reform (Married Women
and Tortfeasors) Act of 19351"8 in England, a married woman had
full powers of disposition over all property including testamentary
capacity. 9 9 Either spouse was thereafter free to dispose of prop-
192. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4425(0 (West 1970).
193. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1980).
194. The approval of the retroactive application of section 5118 of the California Civil
Code, as amended, in In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 427 (1976), will, in the case of separations occurring before 1972, prevent conflicting
claims.
195. E.g., Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974), where the
husband maintained two households and two wives simultaneously.
196. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 716, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
197. Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976).
198. Law Reform (Married Women & Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30, § 2.
199. Prior to 1935 under common law a married woman had virtually no power at all to
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erty upon death. This remains the position today, subject to a pos-
sible claim against the decedent's estate by a spouse who has not
been sufficiently provided for.
Prior to 1976 either spouse could petition the court on the
ground that reasonable provisions had not been made for him by
the deceased spouse and the court had the discretion to award
financial provision out of the estate. 00 The award was limited to
alimony; no property award could be made. In its first working pa-
per on family property law20 1 the Law Commission discussed the
law relating to legal rights of inheritance of property. It later intro-
duced detailed proposals in a second report,20 2 which have now
been enacted in the Inheritance (Provision for Family Depen-
dents) Act of 1975 (the 1975 Act).203 The aim of the Law Commis-
sion was to put a surviving spouse in the position he or she would
have been in upon dissolution.2 0 Just as the MCA allows the court
complete discretion for property distribution upon divorce or nul-
lity, any award made under the 1975 Act is similarly a matter for
the judge. In considering whether to exercise its powers the court
must consider a number of statutory factors which are analogous
to those set out in the MCA.205
With regard to conduct, the Law Commission expressed the
make a will.
200. Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45, § 1.
201. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 44.
202. LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY: FAMILY PROVISION ON
DEATH, LAW CoM. No. 61 (1974).
203. Inheritance (Provision for Family Dependents) Act, 1975, c. 63, § 1 (general note).
204. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 180 at 2.
205. Inheritance (Provision for Family Dependents) Act, 1975, c. 63, § 3 lists the factors
in relation to an application by a spouse as follows:
(a) The financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to
have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant has or is
likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate of
the deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(d) any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any applicant
or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased;
(e) the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased;
(f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant or any beneficiary of the estate
of the deceased;
(g) any other matter, including conduct of the applicant or any other person;
(h) the age of the applicant and the duration of the marriage;
(i) the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family, including any
contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family.
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view that Lord Denning's test in Wachtel °8 should apply equally
to a surviving spouse and that misconduct should only rarely be
taken into account. A person who has in good faith entered into a
void marriage with the deceased may make an application. 0 7 A
former spouse may not apply for a property order, but may apply
for alimony.
It is apparent that the Law Commision rejected the introduc-
tion of a system which would entitle a surviving spouse to fixed
property rights.208 It was concluded that any advantage derived
from the automatic operation of legal rights of inheritance would
be offset by the disadvantage of rigidity.
In California, the principles of community property consist-
ently apply upon the death of either the husband or wife where-
upon one half of the community property belongs to the surviving
spouse and the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition
of the decedent.209 In view of the fact that both spouses now have
present, equal and existing interests in the community property
during marriage, it is erroneous to refer to the share of the surviv-
ing spouse as a mode of inheritance, since he or she is merely tak-
ing what is already his or hers.
There is no statutory scheme governing distribution of quasi-
marital property in the Probate Code. Despite the absence of a
statutory provision, intestate succession cases developed a distrib-
utive scheme parallel to that of the annulment cases by analogizing
to the provision for distribution of community property. Upon the
testate death of one party to a putative union, the surviving puta-
tive spouse takes at least one half of the quasi-marital property.
It is clear then that where a deceased spouse has left a will
without making any provision for the surviving spouse, the differ-
ence between Californian and English law is virtually identical to
the difference that exists between those systems in a divorce con-
text. The argument presented above, discusses a fixed system ver-
206. [1973] 2 W.L.R. 366
207. See text accompanying notes 180-183 supra, and compare the position of a puta-
tive spouse in California upon the death of his partner.
208. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 202, at 5.
209. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956). But note § 210.7 which provides that when-
ever a decedent has made provision by will for the surviving spouse and the spouse also has
a right under § 201.5 to take property of the decedent against the will, the surviving spouse
shall be required to elect whether to take under the will or to take against the will unless it
appears by the will that the testator intended that the surviving spouse might take both
under the will and against it.
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sus a discretionary system. In California the surviving spouse auto-
matically owns one-half of the community or quasi-community
property; that fraction cannot be varied. In England a surviving
spouse may acquire either more or less than one-half of the de-
ceased spouse's estate, or even no share at all.
The gap in California divorce law where there is little commu-
nity property to divide2 10 also arises upon death; in this situation a
surviving spouse can be left destitute.21 The effects can be even
more disastrous upon death than upon divorce. In the latter con-
text a homemaking spouse may still have a reasonable chance of
acquiring working skills and of obtaining employment, whereas in
the event of the death of a spouse, which is likely to occur later in
life, a surviving spouse may be at the age of retirement and there-
fore without any possibility of obtaining employment.
The English system again favors flexibility over certainty. It
should be noted, however, that should the Law Commission's pro-
posals relating to joint ownership of the matrimonial home be en-
acted, 12 a far greater degree of certainty will result from the ensu-
ing right of survivorship.
Where a spouse dies without having made a will, a surviving
spouse in England possesses fixed rights of inheritance computed
according to whether certain next-of-kin of the deceased survive
him.215 The position with regard to separate property is the same
in California with the surviving spouse entitled to fixed inheritance
rights computed according to whether certain next-of-kin survive.
The deceased spouse's own share of the community property
21 4
and quasi-community property1 5 accrues to the surviving spouse.
Both systems possess a common denominator of preserving
the notion of freedom of testamentary disposition over a spouse's
own property. An introduction of fixed property rights in the
surviving spouse in England would violate this fundamental right.
210. See text accompanying notes 170-172 supra.
211. But cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 661 (West Supp. 1980) which provides that in certain
circumstances and if there is no community real property, the court must select and desig-
nate a homestead for the use of the surviving spouse and minor children out of the dece-
dent's separate estate.
212. See text accompanying notes 58-80 supra.
213. The Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23.
214. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
215. Estate of Long, 198 Cal. App. 2d 732, 18 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1961); Estate of Shank,
154 Cal. App. 2d 323, 316 P.2d 710 (1957).
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The effect of the 1975 Act216 is not to impinge upon this right as
such, but rather to create a potentiality for subsequent
modification.
IV. COMMUNITY OR SEPARATION?
Much has been written about the relative desirability of com-
munity property and separate property systems.217 Recent socio-
logical changes have generated renewed interest in the subject. The
foremost sociological development is the changed and still chang-
ing role of women. No longer are women regarded as incapable of
managing their own affairs. More and more women are entering
the work force, some deliberately sacrificing procreation in further-
ance of their careers.
Some writers have taken the view that a system of community
property is merely a protective vestige which remains only as long
as the homemaking spouse is still a common societal phenome-
non.21 8 Thus its usefulness decreases as more women enter the
work force. The fact that the California system recognizes a non-
earning spouse's efforts during the marriage is no major advantage
over the English system. It has been recognized that the English
law's failure to compensate a wife for her services in the home con-
stitutes a basic defect in the system. The situation has been allevi-
ated upon divorce by the introduction of discretionary property
awards under the MCA. The implementation of the latest Law
Commission proposals would greatly aid the homemaker during
the marriage by providing her with a substantial measure of secur-
ity which is at present lacking.
In contrast, a community property system can be responsive
to both single-income and double-income families. Susan Prager21 9
has argued that there is still a need for community sharing princi-
ples where both spouses earn income, because irrespective of the
earnings ratio, spouses do consult with one another on important
216. See text accompanying notes 204-208 supra.
217. E.g., W. Friedmann, A Comparative Analysis in MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 433
(W. Friedmann ed. 1955); Freeman, Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Family Property
Law, 25 CURRENT LEGAL PRon. 84 (1972); Glendon, Is There a Future for Separate Prop-
erty? 8 FAM. L.Q. 315 (1974); Kahn-Freund, Matrimonial Property, Some Recent Develop-
ments 22 MOD. L. REv. 241 (1959); Powell, Community Property: A Critique of Its Regula-
tion of Intra-Family Relations, 11 WASH L. REV. 12 (1954); Prager, Sharing Principles and
the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1977).
218. See, eg., Glendon, supra note 217.
219. Prager, supra note 217.
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decisionmaking issues. She argues from the premise that marital
behavioral patterns in fundamental decisions are not individualis-
tic but rather dualistic.
The ideology of marriage as an institution is also undergoing a
metamorphosis in both countries, perhaps more slowly in England.
No longer are people regarding marriage as inevitably for life, but
rather for as long as each partner is compatible with the other.
Some individuals may make a conscious decision not to marry at
all; others may feel that their personalities are most suited to a
form of group marriage. The increasing diversity in lifestyles indi-
cates that people are beginning to challenge the entire concept of
marriage as an interminable institution and to make their own
choices and decisions about relationships. s0 Ultimately these
choices will necessarily have an impact upon property rights.
In the light of the changing view of marriage which now gener-
ally subsists, individual spouses will continue to attain personal
fulfillment. 21 More than ever before, people are questioning and
evaluating their personal relationships and many express a need to
retain some form of independence within a relationship. Thus a
strong argument can be made that:
[W]hen the widespread expectation that marriage will last only so
long as it performs its function of providing personal fulfillment
is put together with the reality of unilateral divorce ... the in-
creasing economic independence of married women, and the ex-
pansion of social welfare, the resulting state of affairs does not
lead inevitably to the sharing of worldly goods.222
By comparison, it has been argued that irrespective of increas-
ing divorce rates, during the existence of the marriage, a husband
and wife necessarily adopt some sort of sharing system which fa-
vors a system of community property. The average Western family
of today, living with little to spare above current needs and "with
that degree of harmony which makes recourse to the law superflu-
ous, inevitably practices community - rather than separation of
220. Professor Judith Younger has recently proposed the enactment of a variety of le-
gally sanctioned family arrangements in place of the present mode of marriage: a "dress
rehearsal" marriage, companionship status, where heterosexual or homosexual couples with-
out children can enter into any property arrangements, and marriage for children. See Note,
32 VAND. L. REv. 1516 (1979), for a more detailed outline of the above proposals.
221. Glendon, supra note 217.
222. Id. at 327.
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property. ' 2 3
There can be no doubt that some mode of sharing is inevita-
ble. Even if there is no pooling of incomes, spouses at the very
least will share the use of the matrimonial home and household
effects. Separation of property has thus been viewed as an outmo-
ded concept which is no longer part of the living law. 224 Prager ar-
gues that for as long as people retain an "it won't happen to me"
attitude about divorce the disappearance of the notion that mar-
riage is permanent strains but does not dissolve the notion that
sharing will still occur throughout the duration of the marriage.2 25
Whether sharing, which will vary according to the individual
choices of the spouses, automatically mandates a system of com-
munity is debatable. To date, there is no causal nexus between
sharing in fact and sharing in law. Since the latter concept involves
the creation of a legal "norm," which is defined as a value judg-
ment, i.e., an "ought", it cannot logically result from the former
purely factual supposition, i.e., an "is". 228 Thus the fact that
spouses may customarily behave in a certain way does not consti-




The salient feature of the California community property sys-
tem, with its novel equal management and control provisions, is
the legal recognition of a woman's status as equal to that of a man.
Furthermore, both spouses have the security of ownership rights in
the community; such ownership rights are particularly important
in relation to the homemaker.
At present the failure of the law in California to provide a des-
titute spouse with property rights in the other spouse's separate
property upon divorce where there is little or no community prop-
erty constitutes a considerable obstacle in terms of achieving the
underlying purpose of the community property system, equality of
the spouses.
In contrast to California law, English law has not responded to
223. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 217 at 433.
224. Freeman, supra note 217 at 87.
225. Prager, supra note 217 at 19.
226. See H. Kelsen, Value Judgments in the Science of Law in WHAT IS JUSTICE? 209,
218 (1957).
227. Id. at 221.
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the problem of providing the homemaker with financial security
during the marriage. Enactment of the latest Law Commission's
proposals will, however, do much to remedy the situation. On the
other hand, English marital property law does offer the opportu-
nity for the retention of individual freedom and incentive to strive
for self-sufficiency. A fixed sharing situation may not provide such
an incentive and may indeed detract from a spouse's individualis-
tic aspirations. The flexibility provided upon divorce gives the
courts the maneuverability to arrive at a just solution in each indi-
vidual case.
The implementation of the Law Commission's proposals may
indeed achieve the optimum solution by combining community
principles within the basic separation system thus resulting in the
co-existence of flexibility and certainty.
Speculation as to future developments, although instructive,
must not detract from the need to concentrate on immediate ac-
tion to fine tune the working machinery of the marital property
systems in both England and California.
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